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Chapter 5
The Case for Moral Complexity
Marc Fellman

Editor’s Introduction

Via an alternative route to the one taken by Nussbaum, Marc Fellman reaches similar
conclusions to her’s, but the focus of his concerns is somewhat different. He too is a
particularist, focusing his attention on how to morally respond to specific others, how
to be responsible to them, given their specific circumstances, adverse circumstances in
particular. How we respond to others both expresses and determines our moral
understandings. His primary case study is the Holocaust and, reletedly, the
relationship between Hanna and Michael in The Reader. One crucial way of
determining how to respond, including how to judge, involves the imaginative exercise
of putting ourselves in another’s shoes. Doing this, Fellman believes, will allow us to
be more compassionate or, in Nussbaum’s preferred vocabulary, merciful. Fellman
spends some time showing us how the complex weave of practices of responding to
others often leads us, to put things in Walzer’s preferred terms, to get dirty hands; to
be forced to do something bad in order to bring a good about. Of course, the case of
perpetrators of the Holocaust is somewhat different. Their primary aims were deeply
reprehensible. But complexity, which includes our vulnerability to circumstances
which invite us to respond in certain ways, often lead to moral failings, even failings
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that ovewhelm our capacity to understand. Our recognition of this complexity, of the
moral complexity of living humanly, should incline us to judge with care, even in the
light of the moral enormity of the Holocaust. Michael’s complex relationship with
Hanna

paradigmatically

embodies

the

complexity

involved

in

our

moral

understandings of serious wrongdoing, understanding which involves judgment, but
not merely judgment. Brian Penrose and Ward Jones’ contributions nicely
complement Fellman’s piece.

There is a passage in Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader 1 in which the problem of the tension
between judging and understanding is crystallized. It arrives at a moment in the story when
the central character, Michael, comes to the conclusion that simultaneously understanding
and condemning the crimes that his former lover had committed was possibly an
impossible task. For Michael, and in particular because of his past relationship with the
former camp guard, Hanna, it is as if the tension itself resists being accommodated, or even
accorded a satisfactory coherency, within his moral worldview.
I hope to shed some light on Michael’s predicament by situating the tension
between judging and understanding, as it is understood in The Reader, within the context of
a discussion on another powerful tension, that between moral complexity and moral
enormity in Holocaust experiences. That is to say, I think that there are some interesting
parallels between the two tensions. An important claim with respect to my argument is that
the Holocaust more broadly, though not unlike Michael’s personal quandary, represents a
genuine moral problem. On the one hand, the Holocaust appears to encapsulate the
paradigm case of evil while it is also the case that the Holocaust is a modern, human
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phenomenon, the very complexity of which can have the effect of placing into question our
capacity in such matters as judgment. Put another way, enormity analyses, that is analyses
that foreground the moral enormity of the Holocaust, demand that we judge and ascribe
responsibility, yet, for equally urgent reasons complexity analyses compel us to understand
the whys and wherefores of human actions.
First I will expand on the form of the problem of the tension between enormity and
complexity, whilst paying particular attention to establishing the presence and parameters
of moral complexity within both individual moral experiences of the Holocaust and the
Holocaust itself as a defining event. My core concern here is to establish to what extent
there is a tension between moral complexity and enormity.
Specifically, I will argue that moral complexity is informed, in large part, by a
variety of understandings of responsibility. My claim will be that it is the various
understandings of, and issues arising from, responsibility, that are of prime importance to
understanding both moral complexity itself and the tension that arises between complexity
and enormity analyses. By responsibility I mean both particular individuals’ senses of
responsibility as well as more generalised conceptualisations. To clarify, I will elaborate on
the ways of understanding responsibility that I think contribute to the idea that moral
complexity is a core element of accounts of the Holocaust. It is in the context of discussions
of responsibility that I make the link between the twin tensions of complexity and enormity
and judging and understanding.
As a way of visualising the relationship between moral complexity and
responsibility I additionally propose the idea of a ‘weave’ as a means of structuring the
various understandings of responsibility.
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I justify my attention on complexity analyses of the Holocaust because this aspect
of the tension seems more difficult to defend in the face of the moral horror that usually
characterises it.

Moral enormity and the imperative to judge

An invitation into the sort of general awe encountered in the face of enormity evaluations
of the Holocaust is conveyed when Lawrence Langer writes,

...how can we inscribe…[narratives of Holocaust experiences]…in the historical or
artistic narratives that later will try to reduce to some semblance of order or pattern the
spontaneous defilement implicit in such deeds? Where shall we record it in the scroll of
human discourse? How can we enrol such atrocities in the human community…Well,
we can’t: we require a scroll of inhuman discourse to contain them; we need a
definition of the inhuman community… 2

I happen to disagree with Langer’s view that such acts as those referred to by him occurred,
in some sense, in an inhuman universe. On the contrary, part of what contributes to their
incomprehensibility is precisely the fact that they occurred in our universe and were
committed by people with the same sorts of strengths and weaknesses most of us possess.
That said I also think that Langer’s sentiment does convey the power of the horror felt upon
encountering Holocaust accounts. In a vein similar to Langer, Douglas Lackey writes:
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Then evils of the Holocaust are so numerous, so diverse, and so extreme that at first
sight it seems presumptuous to judge them at all, much less than to judge them by
ordinary moral norms. Judgement requires comprehension and transcendence, and
comprehension and transcendence of these events seems almost beyond human power.
The ordinary moral categories feel too pale and narrow to do justice to our sense of
condemnation… 3

The sort of comprehension implied by Lackey is in itself difficult enough but when moral
enormity is accompanied by moral complexity as a component of rendering morally
intelligible, particular events and experiences, then the task is especially problematic. The
combination of moral enormity and moral complexity with regard to the way the Holocaust
was and continues to be understood, brings with it particular difficulties. The requirement
of condemnation serves to restrict the capacity to comprehend the multiple moral
dimensions that are a feature of this complex of events. Or to put it another way, the sort of
enormity analyses often associated with the Holocaust can have the effect of obscuring the
ways in which this same phenomenon is also morally complex. Of course, the opposite can
also be the case. Misguided attention to the presence of complexity analyses can have the
effect of diluting the moral enormity of such experiences.
Part of the challenge lies in understanding the extent of the problem presented by
the tension. Moral enormity, for instance, appears to imply straightforward accounts of the
way moral life is assessed. Moral complexity, on the other hand, suggests that moral life is
anything but amenable to straightforward ways of understanding what is at issue. I intend to
demonstrate that an important hurdle lies in the attempt to understand what the nature of the
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relationship between enormity and complexity may yield for an understanding of both
Holocaust experiences and Michael’s personal moral quandary in The Reader.
One particularly interesting aspect of the tension between complexity and enormity
analyses concerns the issue of the distinction between understanding and judgment. This is
an issue often alluded to in accounts that stress moral enormity and includes the concern
that experiences such as those typified by the Holocaust threaten to overwhelm
understanding. Mary Midgley, in her book Wickedness 4 evokes just such a distinction in
the context of a discussion of the factors influencing human behaviour. She writes:

Infection can bring on fever, but only in creatures with a suitable circulatory system.
Like fever, spite, resentment, envy, avarice, cruelty, meanness, hatred and the rest are
themselves complex states, and they produce complex activities. Outside events may
indeed bring them on, but, like other malfunctions, they would not develop if we were
not prone to them. 5

Midgley’s analogy entices us to pursue its implications for what they may reveal about
individual human behaviour and the factors influencing such behaviour. For Midgley, a key
requirement of understanding why we act the way we do is being able to recognise that
eliciting both social and individual causes is required for properly explaining human
wickedness. Midgely’s aim is to enquire into the question as to why people treat others and
sometimes even themselves abominably. She wants to be able to understand why, as she
puts it “…[people] constantly cause avoidable suffering”. 6 As I indicated above this is
never going to be straightforward. One difficulty concerns the distinction between what she
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refers to as individual and public wickedness. The exact significance of the distinction
becomes evident when the discussion moves to an examination of the issues surrounding
responsibility and, in particular, judgment. Midgley recognises that some actions are
categorically wrong. But she is less clear about how the perpetrators of such actions are to
be placed in a discussion of responsibility.
Midgley is well aware that judgment is sometimes necessary but she also recognises
the complexities and difficulties that judgment entails. Such complexities very often render,
at the very least, certain sorts of judgement problematic. Midgley’s attempt at resolving the
problem of judgment is interesting. She continues her discussion with the claim that moral
judgments function to ‘orient’ us as we plot our way on the path that is moral life. In other
words, moral judgments are a necessary pre-condition for making sense of our own
behaviour as well as the behaviour of others. However, Midgley is careful to point out that
the requirement to judge is not a licence, as she puts it, to stone people. Rather, it is an
important part of understanding the behaviour of others, but understanding can have the
effect of tempering judgment and make us less prone to judging harshly. Extrapolating
from Midgley’s position, I believe judging to be an important social practice and indeed
that the tension is internal to the practice. The tension, though, can make moral life more
difficult and indeed complex. So, judgment, while it is an important component of moral
understanding, it ranks as only one component among others.
I would want to add that whilst I find this aspect of Midgely’s argument plausible,
there is enough evidence to indicate that people are likely to conceive of responsibility as
entailing obligations for which a person is morally accountable. Standardly, emphasis is on
the fulfilment or violation of those responsibilities, deserving of praise or blame, rather than
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understanding what a particular individual might take to be his or her responsibility. This
view is supported by the currency of such terms as ‘retributive justice’ and the proliferation
in both Eastern and Western cultures of a mentality of harsher penalties, increasing
incarceration rates and expanding police forces.
Midgely of course, is not unaware of the significance of judgment as a function of
moral understanding. She writes:

General scepticism about the possibility of moral judgment, though it may look like a
piece of neutral, formal analysis, cannot fail to act as propaganda in this contest of
attitudes. It must make us lose confidence in our power of thinking about moral issues
involving individuals - including ourselves. Yet this power is absolutely necessary to
us. 7

Judgment for Midgely, is a necessary part of what it means to be a ‘responsible agent’. This
is a significant point because, as I argue, moral judgments are a necessary part of the way
we arrive at moral understanding. Many situations are not able to be reckoned with
responsibly without incorporating matters of judgment. There is a need though to
distinguish between certain forms of judgment. To clarify, I may in one situation judge a
person or their actions without holding them accountable in any significant sense. On the
other hand, there are other sorts of situations requiring other sorts of judgments that, whilst
entailing accountability, are also more problematic in the sense that they are morally
complex. Typically such situations would encompass extenuating circumstances like
duress, conflicting loyalties, decisions made without time to consider, a particular
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individual’s proclivity to procrastinate and the like. It is precisely in such situations that the
tension generated by the presence of both enormity and complexity can make certain sorts
of judgment more difficult to defend.
One way of establishing how it is that complexity affects judgment is by shifting the
focus of the discussion to the relationship between judgment and responsibility. There is
some value in placing the discussion on judgment within a more nuanced understanding of
responsibility. It is in the above context that I again question Lawrence Langer when he
disputes an important conclusion of Christopher Browning’s groundbreaking study 8 that
most of us are capable of becoming killers under certain circumstances. Langer seems
distinctly uncomfortable with Browning’s position when he writes quite defensively that:

The fact is that when ordinary men agree to mass murder, for whatever reasons they
cease to be ordinary men like the rest of us and assume the role of killers. 9

Here I think misses a crucial point. It is also arguable that ‘the rest of us’ possess the
capacity, if circumstances are such, to commit terrible transgressions. That is what
Browning’s study so disturbingly demonstrates. My point here is that a discussion of
responsibility in cases such as those described by Browning is crucial not only for what it
can tell us about why individuals do wrong but also because it is core to the case for moral
complexity and our understanding of the form of the tension. Accounting for why people
do wrong requires that we unpack the complex moral byways that individuals travel.
However, it also means that we need to move away from the traditional retributive
understandings of the function of judgment and responsibility. Thus, my account of
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responsibility de-emphasises ideas of responsibility as accountability in favour of
understandings that foreground responsibility as part of our engagement with others with a
view to developing our moral competencies.
There are benefits of a shift away from an understanding of responsibility as
entailing too much of an emphasis on ideas of guilt, blame and punishment. Rather than
necessarily focusing on some perceived imperative to mete out punishment or the idea that
we treat individuals solely as responsible agents that must be held accountable, more
nuanced ways of understanding the variety of dimensions of responsibility can be explored.
In my account this also means maintaining a sense of the very centrality of responsibility in
an understanding of the tension engendered by the combination of complexity and
enormity. Let me also point out here that re-assessing how we might understand
responsibility does not mean that the tension conveniently dissolves. On the one hand, the
enormity of Holocaust experiences and such experiences as those that confronted Michael
in The Reader remain intact. In some instances condemnatory statements, whilst they may
not take the discussion very far forward, may sometimes still be appropriate. Failing to
condemn the horror characterised by Holocaust experiences risks diminishing their moral
significance in our eyes. Moreover, understanding the complexities of a situation, for
example factoring in what individuals take to be their responsibilities or being able to
account for the vulnerabilities that move people to act in reprehensible ways, complex and
important though these issues may be, does not arguably lessen the requirement to also hold
them accountable. However, understanding such moral complexities does lend substance to
the case for moral complexity and may convince us to modify our judgments.
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A weave of ways of understanding responsibility

On my account, responsibility, though it may entail ascriptions of praise or blame, is not
exhausted by them. I want to move the focus of the discussion to develop a more
encompassing account of responsibility and how this account, in turn, lends substance to
the claim for a tension between complexity and enormity.
I contend that the key to understanding life as morally complex lies, in turn, with
understanding various different but related conceptualisations of responsibility. To help to
visualise what I am proposing I suggest that the various nuances of responsibility be
understood as analogous to a ‘weave’ comprised of differing threads. Taken together these
threads represent a rich though complex moral fabric in contrast to the simple but powerful
conceptual strand of moral enormity.
Following this analogy there are a number of different strands that can be identified
as belonging to an understanding of responsibility. Among those that I shall discuss I find
Primo Levi’s notion of responsibility as somehow linked to a concept of goodness,
Margaret Walker’s ‘practices of responsibility’ 10 and Christopher Gowans’ ‘responsibilities
to persons’ 11 particularly interesting threads. As ways of understanding responsibility they
do not of course exhaust how we may fruitfully understand the concept yet they are core to
my account of moral complexity.
The first thread that I want to consider comes from a story by Primo Levi. On my
understanding of this story Levi foregrounds the issue of responsibility in his view of how
the Holocaust might be adequately understood. In this story and in reference to his friend
Lorenzo, Levi evokes a strong sense of how responsibility can manifest itself even in the
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most life diminishing of circumstances. In an account of the way camp life emptied people
of their humanity Levi surmises:

I believe that it was really due to Lorenzo that I am alive today…for his having
constantly reminded me by his presence, by his natural and plain manner of being
good, that there still existed…a remote possibility of good…[and]…for which it was
worth surviving. 12

This quotation suggests that even amidst a systematic attempt to degrade human values, a
moral perspective, in the form of accepting responsibility for other persons, can prevail. In
Levi’s account I interpret Lorenzo as having demonstrated the extreme importance of a
belief in respect for self in the context of relations with the other. In the midst of this
relationship, albeit only briefly discussed by Levi, it seems that two senses of responsibility
and being played out. In the first instance, Levi claims that Lorenzo is in some measure,
although perhaps even unknowingly, responsible for his survival. It also seems evident that
Lorenzo helped to enable Levi to take responsibility for himself and so endure. Examples
like that of Levi’s account of Lorenzo goes to the heart of what I seek to convey in the
understanding of responsibility I am presently defending as that which serves as the
framework of our moral understandings of ourselves. I mention the case of Levi and
Lorenzo in order to illustrate the view that taking responsibility for one’s own situation is
always to take responsibility within the context of our relations with others. It is within the
context of our relations with others that we are able to grasp the dimensions of
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responsibility. In another context, in an interview with Giovanna Borradori, Jacques
Derrida said that:

Responsibility for a decision, if there is any and if one must answer for it, amounts each
time…to a transaction between the imperative for autonomy and the imperative for
heteronomy…. 13

If I understand Derrida correctly his point is that to be responsible is to understand, in some
sense, the plight of the other. Lorenzo’s responsibility for Levi is a paradigmatic case. My
wider point here is that the way in which we take responsibility, in our relations with
others, is how we come to map the complex byways of our moral relations.
In conjunction with the view that moral life is interpersonal, that is, that it is given
meaning by virtue of our interactions with others, I want to introduce, as another aspect of
responsibility, the idea that moral life is culturally situated and sustained by what Margaret
Walker refers to as ‘practices of responsibility’ 14 Elaborating on what she means Walker
writes:

…morality consists in a family of practices that show what is valued by making people
accountable to each other for it. Practices of making morally evaluative judgments are
prominent among moral practices, but they do not exhaust them. There are also habits
and practices of paying attention, imputing states of affairs to people’s agency,
interpreting and describing human actions, visiting blame, offering excuses, inflicting
punishment, making amends, refining and inhibiting the experience or expression of
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feelings, and responding in thought, act, and feeling to any of the foregoing. In all of
these ways we express our senses of responsibility. 15

I think that Walker has captured a very important aspect of responsibility. By linking
responsibility to a variety of social practices, and indeed to morality itself, Walker raises
the prospect that it is these ideas themselves that play an important part in the expression of
our sense of responsibility. And even more to the point, moral competency of the sort
demanded by the sort of experiences that have become a trademark of the Holocaust
requires that we pull together and attempt to render morally intelligible this complex
composite of practices. The sort of practices identified above by Walker offer a sense of the
intricacies entailed in living our lives as moral beings. In their own right they reflect
something of the complexity that I contend is central to the moral lives of human beings. If,
on the one hand, the sorts of moral practices described by Walker entail the ascription
and/or the taking of responsibility they also strongly suggest that such analyses are going to
be complex.
Another important idea connecting moral complexity with responsibility is
Christopher Gowans’ understanding of ‘inescapable wrongdoing’. 16 I suggest that Gowans’
idea of ‘inescapable wrongdoing’ supports the view that moral evaluations are complex. In
his book Innocence Lost Gowans explores moral experience from the perspective of moral
conflict and the claim that sometimes moral wrongdoing is inescapable. Gowans writes:

Many philosophers maintain that in every moral conflict some course of action that is
wholly free from wrongdoing is available to the agent (though it may be difficult, and
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perhaps in some cases virtually impossible, to know what this action is). In my view
these philosophers are mistaken. We may find ourselves in moral conflicts in which,
through no fault of our own we will do something morally wrong no matter what we
do. In these situations we may choose the lesser of two evils and hence act for the best.
But in acting for the best we still choose an evil, and in this sense we still do something
wrong. 17

By challenging the idea that it is always possible to avoid moral wrongdoing Gowans is
contributing to an old debate in Western philosophy over the status of moral dilemmas. He
argues that although a person may decide after careful deliberation that one of two
conflicting responsibilities is more compelling than the other, the less compelling
responsibility does not simply disappear. Instead the secondary responsibility is at best
subordinated in the process of prioritising. I agree with Gowans and hold that his argument
holds even in the case of the Holocaust. The perpetrators, for example, though they knew
they were doing something wrong could still be conflicted over what they take to be their
responsibilities.
A key factor in this grading of responsibilities is the idea that in situations that
would typically constitute serious moral conflict the agent experiences, as a matter of
course, strong emotional responses. Such emotions seem to be, at least for Gowans, prima
facie litmus tests for the presence of moral dilemmas. In other words, feelings such as
anguish at the time of the decision and guilt after the decision result from the recognition
that the situation cannot be resolved in a way that avoids the feeling and knowledge of
moral transgression. Perhaps not surprisingly, such outcomes, emotionally painful though
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they may be, have the potential to enrich our moral lives. Consistent with this, Gowans
writes that it is important to recognise that ‘…our affective moral responses [to certain
situations] can be a source of moral understanding’. 18 This takes me back to my earlier
point about perpetrators. The fact that perpetrators typically felt serious emotional conflict
over their behaviour, something that is well supported by such research as Browning’s, 19
implies some sense of a deeper moral understanding of their own behaviour even if such
understanding does not result in changes to the way they behave in the future.
As a means of tapping this potential for moral understanding in what he calls a
‘logically consistent and systematic way’ Gowans, following Rawls’ conceptualisation of
‘reflective equilibrium’ coins the term ‘reflective intuitionism’. He argues that moral
understanding or ‘moral judgments’ as he calls them result in large part from processes that
are more than mere gut reactions. On Gowans’ somewhat Aristotelian account, moral
understanding comes about largely as the result of the acquisition and development of our
experiences over time and handed down through successive generations. As for moral
dilemmas, he is not saying that in every situation where conflicted feelings are present
moral distress is appropriate. Rather he is stating that there are some situations where such
feelings are appropriate and are felt intuitively.
I believe that Gowans’ account of the factors at play in situations of moral conflict
resonates strongly with the sort of understanding of responsibility that I am seeking to
convey. I think that this is best demonstrated by considering the way in which he pulls his
idea of inescapable conflict together with his understanding of responsibility. He says that
our intuitions concerning feelings of moral anguish are best explained by the more
fundamental proposition that in some situations moral wrongdoing is inescapable. He then
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proceeds to show that it is on the basis of responsibilities to specific persons that
unavoidable feelings of moral distress are grounded. It is this connection between
responsibilities to particular people and the feelings generated by such commitments that
are of interest for my discussion on moral complexity. In regard to this important claim
Gowans writes:

…an agent’s moral responsibilities are based on a recognition of the intrinsic and
unique value of the particular persons (or social entities) with whom the agent has, in
various ways, established some connection. Hence, an agent’s responsibilities are
ultimately responsibilities to specific persons. The nature of these responsibilities is
defined primarily by the agent’s relationship with those persons to whom he or she is
responsible and is not simply a function of the outcome of the agent’s moral
deliberations about what ought to be done in a given situation. For this reason
responsibilities to specific persons may conflict. When they do, the fact that
deliberation of necessity directs the agent to fulfil his or her responsibility to at most
one person does not mean that the responsibility to the other person has in this situation
been eliminated. There will thus be occasions of conflicting moral responsibilities
when, whatever the agent does, he or she will fail to fulfil at least one of these
responsibilities. It is with respect to moral wrongdoing in the case of not fulfilling a
moral responsibility so defined that I believe that moral wrongdoing is sometimes
inescapable. 20
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It’s worth emphasizing that the notion of responsibility, as Gowans understands it, cannot
simply mean that one has duties and obligations toward others. I think, and if I understand
Gowans, responsibility, and this means moral responsibility, is bound with the nature of our
relations with specific others. Somewhat similarly to Walker, this in turn means that
understanding moral life more generally needs to account for the complexities surrounding
discussions about responsibility. Gowan’s own example of Herman Melville’s disturbing
but compelling story of Billy Budd 21 is a good illustration of the sort of discussion I am
referring to.
I believe that whilst our responsibilities might, and likely do, entail duties and
obligations of one sort or another such ways of understanding responsibility are, on their
own, insufficient as explanations as to how we arrive at the place where we are able to
decide between one responsibility and another. The reason that duties and obligations, by
themselves, are insufficient with respect to how we understand our responsibilities, is
because of other significant factors that complicate our understanding of our
responsibilities. In addition to Walker’s practices of responsibility and Gowan’s
responsibilities to specific persons such factors as the role of individual disposition, luck
regarding one’s circumstances and others are pivotal to understanding how it is that we
arrive at our perceptions of our responsibilities.
It is because there are a number of significant conceptual and practical factors that
should be considered when discussing what it is that enables us to understand our
responsibilities that I also believe that the analogy of a weave of ways of understanding
responsibility has merit. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in respect to the
attempt to understand the moral dimensions of the Holocaust. In the course of a person
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arriving at a moral decision, a whole host of factors that relate to the ways that person
understands their responsibilities ‘weave’ there way into the decision making process. The
case of Hanna, the former camp guard in Schlink’s The Reader typifies this point. In the
course of the trial during which Hanna is charged with crimes relating to selections in
Auschwitz and the death of several hundred women who burned to death in a church, she
speaks about her responsibilities, both to herself and others. The narrator writes that in the
course of the trial ‘Hanna wanted to do the right thing…she took on a responsibility to
admit what she could not deny’. 22 And elsewhere we can see how Hanna recalled her
responsibilities as a camp guard. The narrator claims that:

Hanna described how the guards had agreed among themselves to tally the same
number of prisoners [for selection and death in the gas chamber] from their six equal
areas of responsibility. 23

And in the case of the women who burned to death, Hanna, responding to the judge’s
question regarding why she didn’t unlock the doors to the church claims that, ‘We couldn’t
just let them escape! We were responsible for them…’. 24 As a result of a complex
combination of factors, amongst them the interplay of her perceptions of her
responsibilities, her personal fears and the circumstances she found herself in, Hanna
committed wrongs for which she would be held accountable.
If, as I have indicated, a discussion of responsibility is to underpin an account of
moral complexity, it is also the case that a proper understanding of moral complexity
contributes to understanding the extent to which the tension between judging and
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understanding is a central dimension of our moral lives. On a sympathetic reading of the
story of Hanna we can claim to understand her account of her responsibilities yet still
require judgment in the sense that she be held accountable for her actions. However, this
requirement to both understand the complexities of moral life and yet hold a person
accountable for what they do generates a tension that is unavoidable. Michael says as much
when the narrator writes:

I wanted simultaneously to understand Hanna’s crime and to condemn it. But it was too
terrible for that. When I tried to understand it, I had the feeling I was failing to
condemn it as it must be condemned. When I condemned it as it must be condemned,
there was no room for understanding. 25

Returning to Gowans, a large measure of the success of his account of responsibility rests
on the nature of the claim of specific relationships between persons. For Gowans,
relationships, and in turn the responsibilities that derive from these relationships stem from
differing sorts of associations, primary and otherwise, between individuals. In other words,
moral responsibilities derive from particular concrete relationships such as those typified by
relations of kinship, friendship and love. 26 The example of Michael in Schlink’s The
Reader is relevant here. Because of his past relationship with Hanna, as lovers, and because
of his belief that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, Michael felt he had to act in her
defence. His understanding of his responsibility toward Hanna was also based on the
knowledge that he alone had regarding her illiteracy. Even in the presence of this deep
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understanding, but because of all the layers of complexity that it entailed, he was conflicted
by the need to judge her for what she had done.
Gowans’ account of responsibilities to specific persons as substantively informed
by the nature of relationships between intimates represents an important insight into the
way responsibilities are formed more generally. Moreover, I think the value of Gowans’
account lies in its ability to unravel aspects of the practical operations of our moral
relations.
One of the examples that Gowans uses is that based on the sort of intimate
relationship between a parent and child. 27 In this example he describes the responsibility of
a parent to nurture his or her child. Such responsibility, it is argued, comes from a number
of sources not least of which is the accepted knowledge that the infant in question is his or
her child and as such would usually be regarded as intrinsically and uniquely valuable.
Gowan’s intent is to establish a connection between this primary relationship and the way
we perceive the morality of our relations more generally. He is suggesting that the way
people with whom we do not share a close relation or even a distant relation may still be
regarded as intrinsically valuable on the basis of the way we understand ideas of value and
responsibility toward those with whom we are close. In this way Gowans builds an account
of morality extrapolating from relations with intimates.

The case for moral complexity

The discussion of responsibility to date, from Levi to Walker to Gowans is intended to
show how the various ways of understanding responsibility contributes to an account of
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moral life, characterised by a tension between moral complexity and moral enormity.
Gowans identifies how inescapable wrongdoing and moral conflict stem in turn from
understandings of responsibility built up from among other things our ties with intimates. I
am arguing that these concerns, moral conflict and responsibilities to persons, together with
ideas of taking responsibility for ones self, other practices of responsibility and such
accompanying issues as individual disposition, circumstances, luck and the like comprise
the elements of the complexity of moral life. In short, these elements of moral life ensure
that moral life is morally complex. In turn it is these same elements of moral life that enable
us to understand why it is as difficult as it is compelling to judge perpetrators of crimes and
indeed how it is that people commit such crimes in the first instance.
There is a key moment in The Reader that captures this tension poignantly. When
questioned about her role and personal culpability in the selection of prisoners to be sent to
the gas chambers Hanna answers with a question for the judge that goes to the heart of the
claim for the moral complexity of moral life. She asks, or perhaps pleads, ‘I…I mean…so
what would you have done?’ 28 The answer that the judge provides is starkly abstract and
stripped of any real appreciation of what Hanna was asking, rendering it most
unsatisfactory to all who heard it. What Hanna deserved to hear by way of an answer was
what she should have actually done taking into account all facets of the complexity of
moral life. The very tension at issue is what characterises the question and what makes it
impossible to answer satisfactorily. The answer that she received was a statement of the
obvious. What she received was a statement of what she shouldn’t have done. Yes her
situation had been morally perilous but it had been made so by the moral complexity of her
predicament.
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By engaging directly with the judge Hanna is engaging with us all. This is a
question for all who would seek to judge the Hannas of this world. It is a question that
exposes the moral vulnerabilities in us all. It is a question that puts us all in her shoes and
confronts all of us with the stark possibility that as fellow human beings we cannot
guarantee that we would have behaved any differently faced with same set of moral
complexities.
Following Gowans, an important part of our moral response to a particular situation
should be based around an understanding of the wellbeing of the other, whomever that
other may be. In the process of deliberating about the nature of our responsibilities to a
specific person in a specific situation one vital concern ought to be maintenance of the well
being of the other. Of course, because of the wide variety of factors operating at the
interface of deliberation and decision many different moral outcomes are possible. This is
also why in concrete and often complex situations, the ways in which we understand our
responsibilities can, and do, emerge in ways that generate conflict. The case of Hanna is a
prime example.
Of related importance to the case for moral complexity, is the claim that moral life
generally is characterised by complexity analyses. Among the most powerful
representations of this claim, in my view, are accounts of Holocaust experiences. Though
this discussion has dwelt on the story of Hanna, the tension between complexity and
enormity that such stories generate is not restricted to the perpetrators of crimes. In an
interview with Claude Lanzmann, Auschwitz survivor Abraham Bomba, tells a story that
conveys a powerful sense of the tension between complexity and enormity in its
combination of ways of understanding responsibilities, individual dispositions, massively
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impoverished circumstances and the gamut of conflicted emotions that you might expect to
accompany such a story. Recounting Bomba’s story the narrator writes:

I want to tell you something that happened. At the gas chamber, when I was chosen to
work there as a barber, some of the women that came in on a transport from my town
of Czestochowa, I knew a lot of them. I knew them; I lived with them in my town. I
lived with them in my street, and some of them were my close friends. And when they
saw me, they started asking me, Abe this and Abe that - ‘What’s going to happen to
us?’ What could you tell them? What could you tell? A friend of mine worked as a
barber - he was a good barber from my home town- when his wife and his sister came
into the gas chamber…. I can’t. It’s too horrible. Please.
We have to do it. You know it.
I won’t be able to do it.
You have to do it. I know it’s very hard. I know and I apologise.
Don’t make me go on please.
Please. We must go on.
I told you today it’s going to be very hard. They were taking that in bags and
transporting it to Germany.
Okay, go ahead. What was his answer when his wife and sister came?
They tried to talk to him and the husband of his sister. They could not tell them
this was the last time they stay alive, because behind them was the German Nazis, SS
men, and they knew that if they said a word, not only the wife and the woman, who
were dead already, but also they would share the same thing with them. In a way, they
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tried to do the best for them, with a second longer, just to hug them and kiss them,
because they knew they would never see them again. 29

It should be borne in mind that the use of this example is not to serve as a point of reference
to the story of Hanna. The two stories are clearly on a different moral footing and the
distinction between victim and perpetrator is important. Nevertheless, both stories convey
the strength of the tension between both the enormity and the complexity of the events
portrayed. Albeit from very different perspectives both stories convey the sense of moral
failure felt by those involved.

Toward an understanding of moral life

Both moral complexity and moral enormity are present in Holocaust experiences and with
respect to such experiences they are manifest in the deliberations that take place around our
understandings of our responsibilities to self and others. My claim is that such deliberations
with all that this implies, including the tension between judging and understanding, are
what constitutes the moral complexity of our lives.
In the context of Michael’s moral dilemma in The Reader, the discussion on moral
complexity delivered a stark conclusion. Like Michael, if I the reader err too much on the
side of judging the character of Hanna I run the risk of failing to understand her place in the
course of events. Indeed I may fail to understand period. If, on the other hand, I factor in
the moral complexity of her situation I arrive at the conclusion that, in her shoes, I cannot
guarantee I would have behaved differently. Such a conclusion has the potential to
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compromise judgment. Yet judgment remains important. It is this predicament that
underpins the tension between judging and understanding. Hanna made some poor
decisions that led to terrible outcomes. Yet our deeper understanding of the moral
complexity of her situation ought to acknowledge the need for a more reflective and
compassionate appraisal of her. Such is moral life.
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